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High  oil  prices  are  again  transforming  oil-exporting  econo-
mies. Economies that were moribund when oil hovered in the 
$20s for most of the 1990s—and at risk of bankruptcy when 
oil dipped to $10 a barrel in 1998—are now booming. A new 
generation of skyscrapers is rising in the Gulf, in St. Petersburg, 
and in Moscow. Government coffers in oil-exporting economies 
are overflowing with the governments’ (typically very large) cut 
from the oil windfall. Most oil-exporting economies now need 
an oil price of $40 a barrel to cover their import bill, includ-
ing their bill for imported labor—up from $20 a barrel a few 
years ago. But with oil trading above $90 a barrel, they still have 
substantial sums available to invest in the rest of the world.
One feature of oil-exporting emerging economies, though, 
has not changed: their propensity to peg to the dollar. Apart 
from Kuwait,1 the oil-exporting economies that border the Persian 
1. Kuwait shifted from a dollar peg to a basket peg on May 19, 2007. It initially 
implemented its “basket peg” through a series of step revaluations against the 
dollar, but after the 1.7 percent appreciation on July 25, it has allowed small daily 
moves in the dinar. The dinar appreciated by 4 percent between June and the end 
Gulf peg to the dollar even more tightly than China. Other 
oil-exporting economies peg to a basket, often one composed 
mainly of the dollar and the euro. These economies are making 
a policy mistake. The oil-exporting economies that now peg to 
the dollar—or to a basket of currencies of oil-importing econo-
mies—would be better served by a currency regime that assures 
their currencies depreciate when the price of oil falls and appre-
ciate when the price of oil rises. Those that are unprepared for 
a managed float should peg to a basket that includes the price 
of oil. 
The  disadvantages  associated  with  importing  a  monetary 
policy ill-suited to the needs of oil-exporting economies now 
outweigh the gains from importing the United States’ well-devel-
oped institutional framework for conducting monetary policy. 
The strong dollar contributed to the difficulties many emerging 
economies experienced when oil prices fell in the late 1990s. Fall-
ing government revenues led oil exporters to cut spending, draw 
down their external assets, run up their debts, and in Russia’s 
case, devalue and default. Those that sustained their dollar pegs 
also generally experienced deflation and high real interest rates. 
More recently, the weak dollar has made it more difficult for 
the oil exporters to adjust to the rise in the price of oil. After an 
initial period of surprising prudence, the oil-exporting econo-
mies are increasing government spending and investing heavily 
in large government-sponsored mega projects. The result is high 
inflation:  Several  smaller  Gulf  economies  now  have  inflation 
rates well above 10 percent. Low, and in some cases negative, 
real interest rates risk laying the basis for future trouble. 
The oil-exporting economies themselves have the most to 
gain from greater exchange rate flexibility, but the world economy 
would also benefit. The large trade and current account surpluses 
of oil-exporting economies stem from high oil prices, not from 
any competitive edge from their undervalued currencies. 
But the large increase in their dollar holdings over the past 
years has helped to mask the consequences of the large US current 
account deficit. More important, global adjustment will remain 
more difficult than it needs to be so long as the currencies of many 
large surplus countries remain tightly tied to the currency of a 
large deficit country. 
of October 2007. Analysts believe that the dollar has a large weight in Kuwait’s 
basket (McSheehy and Sharif 2007).
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One of the principal dangers currently facing the world economy 
arises from the large and unsustainable imbalances in current 
account  positions.  Some  observers  argue  that  these  imbal-
ances will unwind gradually and nondisruptively, while others 
emphasize the risks of a sudden change of sentiment in financial 
markets that could result in an abrupt and damaging adjustment. 
No one knows which scenario will materialize, but a priority 
for policymakers should be to reduce the risks of a crisis, which 
could produce a world recession and disruptions to the global 
trading system. For that, the global economy requires official 
sponsorship of a credible, comprehensive adjustment program. 
This policy brief outlines such a program.
Section 1 presents why the current situation is unsustain-
able. Adjustment must take place and will require significant 
movements in exchange rates. Section 2 argues that adjustment 
induced by policy actions is more likely to be orderly than one 
initiated by financial markets. We view the current stalemate 
regarding policy actions as dangerous, as financial-market partic-
ipants are likely to change their minds at some stage about the 
sustainability of imbalances unless they see that the main players 
are able to agree on the direction of desirable policy changes. 
Section 3 presents estimates of the exchange rate implications 
of global current account adjustment from a variety of models. 
Section 4 describes the policy implications the authors of this 
brief drew from these results and the workshop discussions.
WHY THE CURRENT SITUATION 
IS UNSUSTAINABLE
There has been a great deal of discussion recently of global current 
account imbalances. Much of the attention has focused on the 
historically large US current account deficit, which, according to 
the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, reached $857 billion (6.5 
percent of GDP) in 2006. The counterpart to this deficit can be 
found mainly in Asia and the oil-exporting countries. Accord-
ing to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China’s surplus 
swelled to an estimated $184 billion (7.2 percent of GDP) in 
2006,1 while Japan recorded an estimated surplus of $167 billion 
(3.7 percent of GDP) last year. High oil prices propelled the 
surplus for countries in the Middle East to $282 billion last 
year. 
1. This estimate appears conservative. China’s trade surplus in goods was $178 
billion in 2006, with imports reported on a cost, insurance, freight (c.i.f) basis. 
When the import data are adjusted to free on board (f.o.b.), the trade in goods 
surplus will likely come in at about $215 billion. Based on trends in the other 
items in the first-half balance of payments, Nicholas Lardy estimates that China’s 
surplus last year was $240 billion (see Nicholas Lardy,  Toward a Consumption-
Driven Growth Path, Policy Briefs in International Economics PB06-6, Washing-
ton: Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 2006).
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DisaDvantages of Pegging 
to the Dollar 
Oil Exporters and Oil Importers Often Need 
Different Macroeconomic Policies
The most often cited advantage of pegging to the dollar is that 
it  allows  an  emerging  economy—especially  one  with  weak 
economic  and  political  institutions—to  import  the  United 
States’ relatively stable monetary policy.  
 
However, the advantages of importing the monetary poli-
cy of a more stable economy—and the associated moves in its 
currency—have to be balanced against the costs of importing 
a monetary policy that does not meet local needs. This risk 
is particularly important for oil-exporting economies, as they 
often end up importing the monetary policy of an oil-import-
ing economy (table 1).
Classic economic analysis differentiates between tempo-
rary  and  permanent  shocks  to  the  price  of  oil,  as  well  as 
between supply and demand shocks. A temporary shock does 





















to end 2006 
(percent)
Saudi Arabia   195.6 8.8 1.4 Fixed (to dollar) –.
Russia   190.8 7.4 14.9 Managed float 
(euro-dollar basket)
39.6
Norway   75.7 .3 4.6 Floating 6.
United Arab Emirates   70. . .6 Fixed (to dollar) –18.9
Venezuela   60.3 .4 5.7 Fixed  –5.6
Iran   60.1 .4 68.7 Managed float .3
Kuwait   55.9 .3 .4 Fixed (to basket)  n.a.
Algeria   53.3 1.7 3.9 Managed float 
(to dollar)
–.0
Nigeria   48.5 1.9 131.9 Managed float
(plans to float 009)
1.8
Libya   38.3 1.3 5.7 Fixed (to special 
drawing rights)
 n.a.
Kazakhstan   4.6 1.5 15. Managed float n.a.
Qatar   1.9 1.0 0.9 Fixed (to dollar)  n.a.
Oman    16.4 0.7 3.1 Fixed (to dollar) –18.4
Bahrain   9.4 0.0 0.7 Fixed (to dollar) –5.4
n.a. = not available
Note: Oman and UAE real effective exchange rate (REER) estimates are based on International Monetary Fund annual data, 
which end with 005. For Nigeria, it reflects revenues of net oil and gas exports. Iran’s exports reflect its fiscal year 005–06.
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics ; IMF Country Reports; BP Global (for energy data); national central banks; 
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not require adjustment. An oil-exporting economy should save 
the oil windfall rather than permanently increasing consump-
tion and investment, while the oil-importing economy should 
dip into its savings to cover a temporary rise in the price of oil 
rather than cutting back on its consumption and investment. 
A permanent rise in the price of oil, by contrast, allows higher 
levels  of  consumption  and  investment  in  the  oil-exporting 
economy and necessitates a lower level of consumption and 
investment in the oil-importing economy. A permanent shock 
should lead to strong economic expansion in oil-exporting 
economies  and  real  appreciation  of  their  currencies  while 
having the opposite effect on oil-importing economies. 
In  theory,  the  costs  of  importing  the  macroeconomic 
policies  of  an  oil-importing  economy  are  far  higher  in  a 
permanent than a temporary shock. They are also larger in 
a global supply shock (change in oil production) than in a 
global demand shock (change in oil consumption). Strong 
demand implies monetary tightening in both oil exporters and 
oil importers, and weak demand implies monetary loosening 
in both oil importers and oil exporters. A supply shock, by 
contrast, calls for different policy responses. An oil-import-
ing economy may want to loosen monetary policy—as long 
as inflationary expectations are contained—to help maintain 
demand  for  other  goods  and  services.  By  contrast,  an  oil-
exporting economy generally may want to offset the intrinsi-
cally expansionary effects of a rise in oil prices with a relatively 
tight monetary policy. 
In  practice,  though,  the  lines  between  temporary  and 
permanent shocks and between pure supply and pure demand 
shocks are hard to draw. Supply—production difficulties in 
Venezuela, Nigeria, and Iraq—and demand—strong growth 
in China and India—often combine to push prices up (or 
down). Distinguishing between a temporary and permanent 
shock in real time is no easier. The fall in oil prices in 1998 
and 1999 proved temporary, but that was of little use to the 
oil-exporting economies that lacked access to the financing 
needed to defer adjustment. Most oil exporters initially acted 
as if the recent surge in oil prices would be temporary, but at 
least some of the rise in oil prices now looks permanent. 
No matter what the reason for a change in the price of 
oil, the oil-exporting economies that peg to the dollar would 
benefit if economic conditions in the United States generally 
moved in line with those in oil-exporting economies. Unfor-
tunately,  the  US  and  major  oil-exporting  economies  often 
have been out of sync. This is a key reason why oil-exporting 
economies that peg to the dollar have not been beacons of 
macroeconomic stability. For example, the 1997/1998 Asian 
crisis  produced  a  demand  shock  that  pushed  the  price  of 
oil down. It also generated a wave of capital inflows to the 
United States that—in conjunction with US-led technologi-
cal innovation—helped push up the value of US equities and 
the dollar. In 2000, oil prices and the dollar moved together, 
as a booming US economy drove the recovery in commodity 
prices (figure 1). More recently, though, a housing slump has 
slowed US growth even as world growth has stayed strong, 
leading the dollar to fall relative to many other currencies. 
Dollar Pegs Imply Too Much Deflation 
or Inflation During Adjustment
Work by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) indicates 
that a 100 percent increase in the real price of oil typically 
leads to a 50 percent real appreciation of the currencies of oil-
exporting economies (Lee, Milesi-Ferretti, and Ricci 2007). 
This adjustment could come from a change in the exchange 
rate. Countries that allow their currencies to float—even with 
extensive management—would likely experience a nominal 
appreciation when oil is strong and a nominal depreciation 
when oil is weak (Frankel 2006). Countries that peg to the 
dollar  or  another  currency  could  achieve  a  similar  result 
through a one-off revaluation—or devaluation.
However, if the country’s exchange rate remains fixed, 
the adjustment in the real exchange rate necessarily will come 
through changes in domestic prices. A rise in the price of oil 
implies a temporary rise in inflation; a fall in the price of oil 
implies a period of deflation. If an oil-exporting economy pegs 
to the dollar, the need for a change in domestic prices would be 
present even if the dollar holds steady relative to other curren-
cies. But if the dollar falls relative to other currencies, pulling 
down the nominal exchange rate of the oil-exporting econo-
mies that peg to the dollar, the increase in inflation needed to 
generate the expected real appreciation goes up. Both the rise 
in the price of oil and the fall in the dollar put pressure on 
domestic prices.
Holding the nominal exchange rate constant and allow-
ing all the real adjustment to come from changes in the price 
level has two important consequences. First, the process of 
inflationary and/or deflationary adjustment is slow. Much of 
the rise in domestic prices associated with a rise in the oil price 
will come after the price of oil has stabilized. Moreover, once 
started, inflationary adjustment can develop its own momen-
tum,  as  economic  agents  anticipate  rising  price  levels  and 
Pegging to the dollar generally has made 
it harder, not easier, for oil exporters to 
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demand higher nominal wages. In some cases, the resulting 
inflationary momentum pushed up the real exchange rate even 
after oil prices had turned down, setting the stage for a real 
overvaluation. The adjustment to a fall in oil prices through a 
fall in domestic prices can also be slow—though in some cases 
the pressures associated with a fall in the price of oil led to a 
sudden devaluation rather than a prolonged period of defla-
tion. Even if adjustment is slow on the upside, it can be sharp 
and sudden on the downside.
Second,  the  inflationary—or  deflationary—adjustment 
process can lead to large swings in the real interest rate. In 
the 1990s, real interest rates in the oil-exporting economies 
that pegged to the dollar were far higher than those in the 
United States. For example, in 1999, Saudi Arabia had an 
inflation rate of –1.3 percent while the United States had an 
inflation rate of over 2 percent, so real interest rates in Saudi 
Arabia were close to 7 percent at a time when the economy 
was contracting.2 In 2006 and 2007, by contrast, real interest 
rates in the oil-exporting economies are generally far lower. 
Real rates in Saudi Arabia—using the stated inflation data, 
2.  Real interest rates are computed by subtracting the year-over-year inflation 
rate realized over any given period from the reported one-year nominal deposit 
rate (IMF, International Financial Statistics, and Bloomberg data). Data for 
2007 have been estimated using the latest available inflation data and the end 
2006 deposit rate.
which probably understate actual inflation (Cevik 2006)—are 
now close to zero. Real interest rates in Venezuela, which pegs 
to the dollar, and Russia, which pegs to a dollar-euro basket, 
are now negative.
The small oil-exporting city-states in the Gulf sometimes 
argue that they should peg to the dollar for much the same 
reason that Hong Kong pegs to the dollar: Their small, open 
economies particularly need a stable anchor. They also hoped 
that the ready availability of imported labor would mute infla-
tionary pressures. In practice, though, these states now have 
some of the highest inflation rates—and the most negative real 
interest rates—in the world (figures 2 and 3). Nominal inter-
est rates are around 5 percent and inflation rates are above 10 
percent in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar (Cevik 
2007). Imported labor ends up putting pressure on rents and 
prices of services. The dollar’s recent slide relative to the rupee 
and the currencies of other countries that supply labor also 
looks set to increase the cost of imported labor. The economic 
cycle of small oil-exporting economies is more closely tied 
to the price of oil than is the economic cycle of larger, more 
diverse economies—and the costs of pegging to a depreciating 
dollar when the price of oil is rising are likely higher for small 
oil-exporting economies.
The overall result: Pegged exchange rates contribute to 
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Figure 1    Oil versus real dollar, 1990–2007
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Figure 3    GCC realized real interest rates, 1998–2007
e = estimate
GCC = Gulf Cooperation Council
Note: Real interest rate = one-year deposit rate minus realized consumer price inflation.
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Figure 2    GCC inflation rates, 1997–2007
e = estimate
GCC = Gulf Cooperation Council
Note: 005–06 Saudi inflation is likely understated.
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of oil leads to an increase in government revenue, in spend-
ing (and government-sponsored investment), and in inflation. 
High inflation leads to negative real interest rates. Fiscal and 
monetary policies turn expansionary at the same time. The same 
dynamics also work in reverse: A fall in the oil price leads to a 
fall in revenue, a fall in spending, disinflation if not deflation, 
and a rise in real interest rates. To paraphrase a famous (though 
culturally inappropriate for the Persian Gulf) metaphor from 
former Federal Reserve Chairman William McChesney Martin, 
the central banks of oil-exporting economies that peg to the 
dollar often spike the punch just as the party gets going instead 
of taking away the proverbial punch bowl. 
Getting Paid in Dollars Is Not a Good Reason 
to Peg to the Dollar
Many  oil-exporting  economies  argue  that  they  peg  to  the 
dollar because oil is priced in dollars. Linking their currency 
to the dollar eliminates the apparent mismatch between the 
government’s dollar-denominated oil revenues and its local 
currency spending. 
This logic, however, fails to accurately diagnose the real 
fiscal  problem  of  oil-exporting  economies.  Oil-exporting 
economies’ fiscal difficulties stem from large fluctuations in the 
dollar price of oil, not from a mismatch between dollar reve-
nues and local currency spending. Large swings in the dollar 
price of oil—Brent crude has traded between $10 and $80 a 
barrel over the past 10 years3—translate into large swings in the 
revenues of the governments of oil-exporting economies.4 They 
consequently face a mismatch between their volatile revenues 
and their relatively stable spending commitments. 
Pegging to the dollar does not help reduce the volatility of 
oil revenues. A more flexible exchange rate, by contrast, could 
help dampen oil-related swings in government revenues.
A concrete example helps illustrate this point. For the 
past decade, Saudi Arabia has pegged its currency to the dollar 
3. The standard deviation of annual oil price moves over the past 10 years is 
$11 a barrel (Gianella 2007).
4. The exact institutional arrangements for transferring oil export revenues to 
the government differ from country to country. Three examples are illustra-
tive: For oil revenue, Russia’s government relies on export taxes (collected in 
dollars) and the mineral resource extraction tax (collected in rubles) rather 
than full ownership of a single national oil company. It gets an estimated 85 
percent of the marginal revenue from any increase in oil price (Gianella 2007). 
Kuwait, by contrast, owns the national oil company. It allows the company 
to deduct its expenses from its sale of crude, a pricing structure that gives the 
government 100 percent of the marginal revenue associated with a rise in oil 
prices. Back when oil was in the $20s, the government of Kuwait received over 
80 percent of the country’s oil revenue. That total is now around 90 percent. 
Saudi Arabia also relies on a national oil company—Aramco—rather than on 
an export tax. But Aramco benefits from a slightly different institutional ar-
rangement: 93 percent of its profits are transferred to the government through 
dividends and royalties, with Aramco retaining 7 percent (Marcel 2006).
at a constant rate of 3.75 Saudi riyal to the dollar—so one 
riyal has been worth 27.7 US cents. The Saudi government’s 
revenues from oil exports have swung wildly, hitting a low of 
$40 billion (150 billion Saudi riyal) in 1998 and a high of 
$160 billion (600 billion Saudi riyal) in 2006. If the Saudi 
riyal had instead been pegged to a basket composed of equal 
measures dollar and oil (indexed 3.75 Saudi riyal to the dollar 
corresponds to the 2001 oil price), the riyal would have fallen 
to a low of 20 cents in 1998 and risen to 50 cents in 2006. The 
revenue stream from Saudi Arabia’s oil—expressed in Saudi 
riyal—would also still have risen and fallen with the price of 
oil, but the peaks and troughs would have been smaller. The 
result: less volatility in the revenue from oil exports in the 
currency that really counts—the oil-exporting economy’s own 
currency (figure 4).
A currency that appreciated would tend to reduce the local 
currency revenues from oil when oil was high, and a currency 
that depreciated would tend to increase those revenues when 
oil was low. This does not reduce the size of the country’s oil 
windfall—the windfall just shows up as a rise in the external 
purchasing power of a country’s currency rather than a rise 
in the government’s oil export revenue. It would, however, 
change the way the windfall is distributed. If the country’s 
currency  is  pegged  to  the  dollar,  the  government  initially 
captures the entire windfall through a rise in its revenues. If, 
by contrast, the country’s currency rose along with the price 
of oil, the government’s local-currency revenue windfall would 
be smaller, but the external purchasing power of all local sala-
ries would rise. 
Look to Fiscal Policy—Not Dollar Pegs—to Cure 
Dutch Disease
 
Another argument often made in favor of dollar pegs is that 
oil-exporting economies should avoid allowing their curren-
cies to appreciate when oil appreciates in order to insulate 
their nonoil economy from large swings in the price of oil. 
Pegging  to  the  dollar  is  argued  to  be  an  effective  defense 
against Dutch disease—the risk that an expanding oil sector 
will siphon resources out of other sectors, leading the nonoil 
economy to contract. 
This argument is not persuasive. If a rise in the real value 
of the currency of an oil-exporting economy is damaging when 
oil is strong, surely it is more damaging when oil is low—yet 
Oil-exporting economies tend to save in 
dollars because they peg to the dollar, 
not because oil is priced in dollars. N u m b e r   Pb0 7 - 8                                                                                                                                                                                     N O Ve m b e r  2 0 0 7
7
oil-exporting economies that pegged to the dollar experienced 
exactly that unhealthy combination in the late 1990s. More 
recently, dollar pegs have led the currencies of oil-exporting 
economies to depreciate even as oil rose. The need to avoid 
Dutch disease may justify policies that limit the real appre-
ciation of the currencies of oil-exporting economies when the 
price of oil rises, but it hardly justifies a real depreciation. 
Most important, a conservative fiscal policy—not a dollar 
peg, a euro peg, or even a basket peg—is the key to avoid-
ing Dutch disease. Norway is a prime example: Its oil revenue 
initially flows into Norway’s oil fund (recently renamed the 
Government  Pension  Fund—Global),  not  to  the  budget. 
Only the real income from the oil fund’s financial assets is 
theoretically available to support current spending (Norges 
Bank 2007).5 Poorer countries with larger immediate needs 
and countries with larger oil reserves and thus a more durable 
revenue stream from oil will likely opt to spend a higher frac-
tion of their current oil income than Norway. But the basic 
principle still holds. A country that pegs to the dollar and 
spends the majority of any surge in oil revenues—whether 
5.  Recently Norway relaxed this constraint; it is currently spending a bit more 
than the oil fund’s real income.
from the discovery of a new oil field or a surge in oil prices—
will still experience a real appreciation. A country that channels 
the majority of any increase in its oil revenues into an endow-
ment fund can avoid Dutch disease no matter what its currency 
regime. 
exchange rate flexibility coulD 
facilitate global aDjustment 
Surpluses in one part of the world have to be offset by deficits 
elsewhere. So long as oil-exporting economies believed the 
surge in oil prices would prove “temporary” and built up their 
foreign assets rather than increasing their spending or invest-
ment, the oil-importing economies collectively had to run a 
large deficit. However, the recent large increase in the surplus 
of  oil-exporting  economies  has  been  offset  entirely  by  an 
increase in the US external deficit. Europe’s external balance 
has not changed much, while East Asia’s collective surplus has 
actually increased—even though East Asia imports more oil 
than the United States. A rise in oil prices ended up adding to 
the deficit of the region with the largest existing deficit, not 


















Saudi revenues with riyal at 3.75 Saudi revenues with riyal that moves with oil
dollars per riyal (actual) dollars per riyal (riyal tracks oil)
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Figure 4    Exchange rate flexibility could stabilize Saudi oil revenue with riyal 
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The exchange rate regimes of the oil-exporting econo-
mies arguably contributed to this peculiar—some would say 
perverse—result. 
If the currencies of the oil-exporting economies rose with 
the price of oil, the external purchasing power of salaries paid 
in the local currency would rise automatically. The combina-
tion of dollar pegs and the dollar’s 2003 and 2004 fall worked 
in the opposite way. The external purchasing power of salaries 
paid in local currency fell even as the country’s export revenues 
soared. The increase in imports eventually came, but it came 
only after budgets were adjusted to increase spending—and in 
the Gulf, after policy decisions to use more of the windfall to 
finance domestic investment.6 
In principle, a rise in the currency could reduce the price 
of existing imports enough to offset any increase in import 
volumes, leading to a fall in overall spending on imports.7 
6.  Rebucci and Spatafora (2006) and IMF (2006a, 2006b) both found that 
the initial increase in imports in the oil-exporting economies was relatively 
modest in comparison with earlier oil price spikes. Recent Russian balance 
of payments data—and anecdotal evidence from the Gulf—suggest a much 
stronger increase in imports (Bank of Russia 2007; IMF 2007a, 2007b). 
7.  This is the Marshall-Lerner condition. The volume of oil an economy 
exports—and its price—are not a function of the country’s own exchange rate 
In practice, once the oil windfall starts to trickle down into 
private hands, both import volumes and the import bill of 
oil-exporting  economies  tend  to  grow  quite  rapidly.  High 
saving rates in certain oil-exporting economies generally have 
stemmed from a rise in government saving rather than a rise in 
private saving (IMF 2006a, 2006b). See figure 6.
The need to deter too rapid an increase in spending and 
imports is sometimes cited as a reason for oil-exporting econo-
mies to maintain pegs, as a pegged exchange rate—or more 
accurately the difficulties of real adjustment associated with 
pegs—could encourage oil exporters to use fiscal policy to 
sterilize the oil windfall by building up the country’s external 
assets. However, the populations of most oil-exporting econo-
mies expect to share in the oil windfall, making such policies 
difficult to sustain. As important, rigidities that inhibit adjust-
ment also can work the other way. Countries tend to be at 
least as reluctant to cut spending when the price of oil falls as 
to increase spending when the price of oil rises. 
To rely on the governments of oil-exporting economies to 
correctly judge the long-term price of oil—and thus the right 
regime, so the impact of a change in the exchange rate on the trade balance 
boils down to its impact on imports.
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook.
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level of domestic spending and investment—is risky. Rather 
than adjusting spending as oil prices change, it is far easier 
to allow the external purchasing power of a country’s existing 
spending to vary with the price of oil. More exchange rate flex-
ibility would reduce the risk of an overly conservative response 
to a rise in the price of oil as well as the risk of an insufficiently 
conservative response to a fall in the price of oil.
The pace of economic adjustment to a rise in the price 
of oil is primarily a function of the persistence of the gap 
between the increase in oil export revenues and the increase in 
spending on imported goods and services. However, the allo-
cation of rapidly growing external portfolios of oil-exporting 
economies also shapes the global response to a rise in surpluses 
of oil-exporting economies. Many oil exporters—particularly 
Russia and the Gulf countries—are far more willing to buy 
American financial assets than to buy American goods (Euro-
pean  University  Institute  and  Gulf  Research  Center  2007, 
European  Central  Bank  2007).8  Imports  from  the  United 
States account for 5 percent of Russia’s total imports while 
dollars account for a bit under 50 percent of the Bank of 
Russia’s reserves. Imports from the United States account for 
about 10 percent of the Gulf’s total imports, while recent esti-
mates (Woertz 2007, Institute of International Finance 2007) 
suggest dollar-denominated assets account for as much as 60 
8.  This is why IMF analysis suggests that a rise in the price of oil would 
increase the US current account deficit even if the oil-exporting economies 
increased their imports to match the increase in their export revenues (Rebucci 
and Spatafora 2006).
percent of the Gulf’s portfolio.9 As a result, a surge in saving 
in the oil-exporting economies—and specifically a surge in 
government saving—leads to a surge in demand for dollar-
denominated assets. Strong demand for dollar-denominated 
assets,  in  turn,  facilitates  the  expansion  of  the  US  current 
account deficit (figure 7). 
The fact that oil is priced in dollars is sometimes argued 
to be a key source of the “exorbitant privilege” that the United 
States enjoys because of the dollar’s international status. Yet 
nothing  requires  that  oil-exporting  economies  hold  dollar 
assets just because oil is priced in dollars. The dollars earned 
from the sale of oil can easily be exchanged for euros and other 
financial assets. Oil-exporting economies tend to save in dollars 
9. Reliable data on the currency composition of the savings of major oil 
exporters are rare. Gulf central banks and oil investment funds do not disclose 
the currency composition of their assets (and some investment funds do not 
disclose the size of their holdings). US data also fail to capture those dollars 
that the oil investment funds hold “offshore” and will not attribute to the Gulf 
dollars handed over to external managers (Setser and Ziemba 2007; Toloui 
2007; BIS 2007; Higgins, Klitgaard, and Lerner 2006). Most analysts believe 
that the Gulf central banks generally hold a much higher fraction of their 
assets in dollars than the large oil investment funds. The UAE holds around 
95 percent of its reserves in dollars (down from 98 percent in 2005) and has 
indicated that the dollar’s share could fall to 60 percent over time (Derrick 
2007). Oman holds 80 percent of its reserves in dollars, and Qatar between 65 
and 90 percent (Brown 2007). The Saudis have not released data on the cur-
rency composition of the foreign assets of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
but the estimates of Saudi banks range from 75 to 85 percent (Bourland 2007, 
Sfakianakis 2007). The Qatari investment authority recently indicated that 
dollar-denominated assets constitute only 40 percent of its portfolio (Reuters 
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Figure 6    Imports and current account surplus of emerging oil exporters 
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because they peg to the dollar, not because oil is priced in 
dollars. Oil-exporting economies that let their exchange rates 
float—like Norway—or that peg to a dollar-euro basket—like 
Russia—generally have lower dollar shares in their portfolio 
than countries that peg to the dollar. 10 10 But so long as the Gulf 
countries  peg  to  the  dollar,  they—like  China—cannot  sell 
dollars without running a risk of pushing their own exchange 
rate down. The investment funds of some of the smaller Gulf 
economies do seem to have diversified away from the dollar. 
Consequently, this constraint is likely to be more severe for 
the large oil-exporting economies than for the smaller econo-
mies.11 
10.  Russia reduced the dollar share of its reserves from around 70 percent 
in 2004 and 2005 to around 50 percent in early 2006, even though it still 
prices its oil in dollars. In late 2006, Russia reported that 45 percent of the 
stabilization fund and 49 percent of its broader reserves were in dollars, with 
the remainder mostly in euros and pounds (Johnson 2006, Russian Ministry 
of Finance 2006). Norway also provides detailed data on the composition of 
the portfolio of its government pension fund: 33 percent of its equity portfolio 
and 30 percent of its bond portfolio are invested in the United States (Norges 
Bank 2007).  
11. Venezuela, for all its political differences with the United States, still holds 
80 percent of its reserves in dollars (Parra-Bernal 2007), though a growing 
share of its dollar reserves seem to be held “offshore.” Libya also seems to hold 
a large share of its reserves in “offshore” dollars (BIS 2007). Iran, by contrast, 
has shifted its reserves out of the dollar (Ahmad 2007).
The United States’ ability to tap petrodollars to finance 
its large external deficit depends far more on oil-exporting 
economies’ willingness to maintain dollar pegs than on the 
continuation of the market practice of pricing oil in dollars. 
This, however, does not mean that the United States has an 
interest in encouraging oil-exporting economies to maintain 
their dollar pegs. The longer the United States draws on petro-
dollar financing to defer a necessary adjustment, the greater 
the risks to both parties. The United States will become ever-
more exposed to a sudden shift in the portfolio of oil-export-
ing economies. The oil-exporting economies with dollar-heavy 
portfolios,  particularly  those  that  trade  extensively  with 
Europe and Asia, will be more exposed to further falls in the 
dollar (Angermann, Schaefer, and Thiesen 2007). 
alternatives to Pegging to the Dollar
Dollar pegs are not a necessary result of dependence on export-
ing a commodity that generally is priced in dollars. Other 
exchange rate regimes are possible. Many advanced commod-
ity-exporting economies—Norway, Australia, New Zealand, 
and Canada—allow their currencies to float. 
One often-discussed policy shift, a revaluation, would help 
to address current concerns about imported inflation without 
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changing much else. The monetary policies of oil-exporting 
economies would continue to be tied to the monetary policy 
of the United States—and the oil-exporting economies would 
remain exposed to further falls in the dollar. Alternatives to 
both a pure dollar peg and a series of revaluations to the dollar 
are discussed below.
Pegging to an Advanced Economy 
Other than the United States
The euro is the most obvious alternative. However, the euro-
zone also is not ideal for a major oil-exporting economy, as 
it too imports oil and other commodities. Moreover, shift-
ing from a dollar peg to a euro peg after the euro already has 
appreciated substantially also might not accomplish much. By 
some measures the euro is now overvalued against the dollar. If 
oil stays high, the last thing most oil exporters need to do is to 
start to peg to the euro just when the euro starts to depreciate 
against the dollar.
Pegging to the currency of another commodity exporter has 
obvious appeal. Australia is one candidate. Australia does not 
export oil, but the same forces that push up the price of oil 
often simultaneously push up the price of other commodities. 
The Australian dollar has moved together with the price of 
oil more frequently than the US dollar—or the Saudi riyal. 
But this correlation may not hold during a major oil-supply 
shock. Moreover, Australia has a substantial current account 
deficit. The Canadian dollar seems a better fit, given Canada’s 
external surplus and its energy exports. However, Canada’s 
substantial manufacturing sector is deeply integrated into the 
US economy, so its economic cycle has historically been corre-
lated closely with that of the United States (figure 8). Most 
emerging oil exporters have smaller manufacturing sectors and 
trade more with Europe and Asia. Norway is as closely inte-
grated with Europe as Canada is with the United States; it too 
is not a perfect fit. No single currency seems ideal.
 real effective exchange rate index (1995 = 100) dollars per barrel (WEO blend)
Figure 8    Australian and Canadian real exchange rates move with oil; 
                      Saudi real exchange rate does not, 1995–2007
WEO = World Economic Outlook
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Pegging to a Basket of Currencies
Many oil-exporting economies currently peg to a basket. The 
Russians peg to a euro-dollar basket; Libya pegs to the special 
drawing rights (SDR; a basket of dollars, euros, pounds, and 
yen); and Kuwait recently decided to shift back to a basket 
peg.12 The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) reportedly has 
considered  shifting  to  a  basket  peg  after  its  planned—but 
increasingly unlikely—2010 monetary union.
Shifting from a dollar peg to a basket peg would reduce 
other oil-exporting economies’ exposure to further falls in the 
dollar against the euro—though a euro-dollar basket does not 
help if both the euro and the dollar fall against many Asian 
currencies. Pegging to a broad basket would reduce an oil 
exporter’s exposure to the moves of any one currency. However, 
it does not really help manage oil price volatility. The real price 
of oil has increased relative to a basket of euros, dollars, yuan, 
and yen—not just relative to the dollar. The currencies of oil-
exporting economies consequently face pressure to appreciate 
12.  Kuwait had a basket peg before it joined the GCC’s common dollar peg 
in 2003.
in real terms against a basket of currencies of oil-importing 
economies, not just against the dollar. 
Pegging to a Basket that Includes the Price of Oil
Jeffrey Frankel (2003) has suggested that oil-exporting econo-
mies should peg their currencies to the price of oil. A one-to-
one peg to oil goes too far. So long as the price of oil remains 
volatile, pegging directly to the price of oil would result in 
excessive swings in the exchange rate. A less draconian option—
pegging to a basket that includes the oil price—would assure 
that the currency of an oil exporter generally moves with the 
price of oil while dampening the volatility associated with a 
pure oil peg.
Figure 9 plots moves in the price of oil, moves in the 
Saudi riyal, and moves in two potential basket pegs—one with 
a 50 percent oil share, the other with a 30 percent oil share. 
Even if oil’s share in the basket were only 30 percent, moves in 
the price of oil would have dominated other currency moves 
over the past few years, leading the currency of oil export-
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Figure 9    Oil basket peg, December 1998–September 2007 
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an arrangement would mimic the response of most floating 
currencies  to  commodity  price  shocks,  without  requiring 
that oil-exporting economies be ready to manage their own 
autonomous monetary policy. 
A Managed Float
Floating—whether a pure float or a managed float more like 
that practiced today in many emerging economies—offers a 
final alternative to existing dollar pegs. Exchange rate flex-
ibility has helped advanced commodity-exporting economies 
manage commodity price fluctuations. For example, during 
the Asian crisis, the Australian dollar depreciated along with 
commodity prices. This depreciation—along with the fact that 
most of Australia’s external debt was denominated in Austra-
lian  dollars—helped  the  country  avoid  a  recession.  When 
commodity prices rebounded, so did the Australian dollar. 
Norway and Canada have resisted joining the monetary 
unions  with  their  respective  large  neighbors  despite—or 
perhaps because of—their large oil exports. Many emerging 
economies, including several commodity-exporting emerging 
economies, now also float successfully. Mexico both exports 
oil and floats relatively cleanly. Two other commodity-export-
ing  emerging  economies—South  Africa  and  Brazil—allow 
substantially more exchange rate flexibility than is the norm 
for large oil exporters. The South African Reserve Bank and 
Brazil’s central bank intervene in the foreign exchange market 
far  more  frequently  than  does  the  Federal  Reserve  or  the 
European central bank (ECB). But their currencies are still 
substantially more flexible than the currencies of many oil-
exporting economies.
CONCLUSION 
Pegging to the dollar generally has made it harder, not easier, 
for oil exporters to adjust to large swings in the price of oil. 
All too often, the dollar has fallen when the price of oil is 
rising and risen when the price of oil is falling. Dollar pegs will 
not prevent the currencies of oil-exporting economies from 
eventually  appreciating  in  real  terms.  Indeed,  higher  levels 
The oil-exporting economies that 
are unprepared for a managed 
float should peg to a basket 
that includes the price of oil. 
of government spending in oil-exporting economies—along 
with a surge in private and state-led investment—are currently 
pushing up wages, prices, and imports in most oil-exporting 
economies with fixed exchange rates. But the fact that adjust-
ment has started does not eliminate the case for changing 
policy. The adjustment process has been slow, and too much 
of the necessary real appreciation has come from a potentially 
damaging rise in inflation. 
The current de facto currency union between many oil-
exporting countries and the United States is an anachronism. 
The macroeconomic policy needs of the United States and the 
large oil-exporting economies are unlikely to converge—and 
the dollar is unlikely to start moving together with the oil 
price. Many emerging economies have experimented success-
fully with a managed float. Those oil-exporting countries that 
lack  the  institutions  to  conduct  an  autonomous  monetary 
policy should peg to a basket that includes the price of oil. 
Exchange  rate  flexibility  would  reduce  the  need  for 
domestic prices in the oil-exporting economies to rise and 
fall along with the price of oil, create additional room for 
monetary policy to reflect domestic conditions, and help oil-
exporting economies manage the large swings in government 
revenue that accompany large swings in the oil price. The time 
has come to decouple the currencies of large oil-exporting 
economies from the dollar. 
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